individuals with histories. A donor simply never becomes a person. This is key because in Germany a person cannot be perceived to die in order for someone else to live. Thus, while the organ can “live on” as described in transplant rhetoric, the person must not (159-60).

Identification of the donor is circumscribed and prevented, then, by the identification of the German state with “stark images of power and inhumanity,” (187) particularly in connection with medical uses of bodies.

In both works dead bodies are critical vehicles for the expression of political identities and moral values. In Verdeny’s work, rightful claims to territory are built on grave sites. Although territoriality does not figure as large in the identity-building aspects of Hogle’s work, territorialities linger in definitions of which organs are “better” for transplant. The re-identification process brought about by the unification of the two Germanies necessarily continues repudiation of Nazi approaches to the nation as a “social body.” Germany was not understood as an integrated society until National Socialism—a time that most Germans wish had never happened—and any new nationalism under reunification must continue to repudiate the Nazi past (188).

Both Verdeny and Hogle have engaged with a subject that is largely ignored and in some ways, almost taboo in large parts of Western (and Westernized) society: dead bodies. Using this lesser known pathway, both writers have asked about the place of the dead in specific communities and the meanings assigned to them. While this path diverges into different locations for the dead in these communities, Verdeny and Hogle have described and analyzed these locations with skill and in depth. Neither author has been stopped by disciplinary boundaries around political science (Verdeny) nor anthropology (Hogle), making both works accessible to diverse constituencies. Verdeny’s work covers wider ground, emphasizing the role of the dead in providing insight into major world political events. While Hogle’s focus is somewhat narrower, it is nonetheless rich in its historical and current analysis of the cultural place of dead bodies in Germany. Nadia Seremetakis (1991: 14) has commented that the institutions of death, (either burial and reburial or organ donation procedures and practices) “function as a critical vantage point from which to view society.” Verdeny and Hogle have, in their respective ways and towards their own ends, used this vantage point well.

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References


Film Theory and Enunciation


By Bart Testa

Francesco Casetti's Inside the Gaze is the translation of the author’s Destino lo sguardo: il film e il suo spettatore, published in 1986. Its core chapter appeared in 1983 as “Looking for the Spectator” in Iris 2. In 1989, Dentro lo sguardo was rendered in French as D’un regard l’autre: Le film et son spectateur. That edition included a collegial introduction by Christian Metz, in the English edition, “Crossing over the Alps and the Pyrenees,” Metz does not allude to the strong criticism directed toward his Italian colleague in his final book L’Enunciation impersonnelle (1995), the conclusion of a dialogue Metz conducted with Italian semioticians running since the middle of the 1960s. No full translation of L’Enunciation impersonnelle has appeared. However, Warren Buckland’s anthology, The Film Spectator: From Sign to Mind includes an almost seminal first chapter and it is set beside “Face to Face,” an essay compressing Casetti’s theory of enunciation. This anthology of translations, The Film Spectator, is now partnered with Buckland’s expository account, The Cognitive Semiotics of Film, which includes a chapter on the Metz-Casetti exchange.

I started by scanning the publishing history behind the books under review in order to indicate two points developed in the first part of this review. First, there has been a delay of more than a decade between initial publication of these texts and their translation, and Buckland’s expository book. Second, despite its seemingly restricted, even technical role, as a semiotic model of cinematic narration, enunciation has a storied career in film semiotics. In the 1970s enunciation provided focus for both "text semiotics" in cinema and what today is termed “film spectatorship.” From the start, which is to say in the late 1960s, when film semioticians took over Emile Benveniste’s seminal formulation (1971: 205-215), enunciation presented myriad challenges to film theory. Benveniste’s original model dealt with natural language, specifically with parole/discours. He sited the process of producing discours in the speech situation involving persons using verb tenses and he analysed special signs – personal pronouns, and adverbs — that function as indices of place and time. These specifications are doubly rooted: in natural language and the real-time/place of persons who meet and talk. Film semioticians adopted enunciation to cinema’s highly flexible audio-visual representations of time and space and applied it variously to: model the production of cinematic texts; to analyse as narrational mediation between cinema’s codec virtuality and filmic textual cinematic concretion; or, to model viewers’ placement (e.g., “subject positioning”) within the circuitry of cinematic representation.

No application of enunciation to cinema passed without controversy. In a review of the applications to cinematic narration, David Bordwell concludes that the challenges of transferring enunciation from Benveniste’s linguistic model to the audio-visual art of cinema has never been resolved: “because a film lacks equivalents for the most basic aspects of verbal activity, I suggest that we abandon the enunciation account.” (1986: 26) Bordwell’s conclusion was retroactive. As far as English-language cinema studies was concerned enunciation had disappeared from its agenda by the 1980s. Controversy over enunciation arose because the complicated roles it played in film criticism overburdened the concept before film semiotics had resolved basic theoretical problems. Critics deployed enunciation, for example, as a criterion to distinguish films that seem to occlude or to foreground discours. Semioticians of discourse analysis described classes of indicators (“shifters,” for instance) that articulated the self-reference operations of enunciation and differentiated it from “text semiotics.” Film critics mingled this analysis with the modernist concept of self-reflexivity (or self-reference) and with ideological critique. Especially at Cahiers du Cinéma, critics proposed to make ideological differentiations between “classical” and “progressive” [film] texts (Comolli and Narboni 1969) on the basis of whether films revealed their discursive properties. The criteria served in distinguishing avant-garde or progressive cinema, which supposedly erased enunciative marks and poses as histoire (unmarked "story"), and therefore positioned the spectator passively in receiving a film, from “avant-garde” (or "modernist" or "progressive") film texts that foreground discourse and hence activate a more politically critical spectator (or, in Metz’s words, “spectator”).

It is notable, given the ideological role that enunciation therefore played in film theory and criticism, that Muscio and Zemigan recently credit Casetti’s work on enunciation because “he has continued certain trends and brought into play an innovative thrust.” (1991: 23) Their praise is astonishing in its ideological neutrality. It leaves us with a dilemma. Is the "technical" attitude toward enunciation they attribute to him and, if so, whether it is creditable. Another question Muscio and Zemigan leave us to ask is if Casetti successfully continues, revisits, or recasts a topic in a manner that transforms its storied reputation in cinema studies. Whether and how a viewer participates in a film’s “text production” or translation, or a more peripheral bystander to a spectacle — and this is the base line of alternatives at which Casetti sets the problem — can never, hypothetically, cease to be an interesting question. However, the methods Anglophone film scholars have used to configure the issue have, for a decade now, disconnected the question from enunciation. In its current form film theory has run down to the point where Bordwell frankly calls for abandoning it altogether.

The original dates of publication of these books under review run mainly through the 1980s. Film semiotics as a whole, and not just enunciation, was then in eclipse in Anglophone cinema studies. Translations and commentaries by Casetti and Buckland offers a slender bridge over a yawning generational silence about semiotics of cinema. He belatedly seeks to reconnect Franco-Italian research to the Anglophone reader: The Film Spectator provides sample texts, Cognitive Semiotics of Film provides exposition. With his two books under review, Casetti has now reached
substantial English translation but he is the only Continental film semiotic to have done so in a decade. Moreover, his door into Anglophone cinema studies was opened by scholars like Dudley Andrew (who provided a preface, while his student Charles O'Brien co-translated Inside the Gaze), whose attitudes toward film semiotics range from lukewarm to hostile. American dialogues with Casetti have been courteous but without signs that his writings place semiotics back on the cinema studies agenda.

While the topic of Inside the Gaze is not influential, Casetti's theory is not enunciation as it appeared in the 1970s. What is the right context in which to read Casetti, then? The Cognitive Semiotics of Film situates Casetti and Metz's critique of him within Continental semiotic research that Buckland takes still to be contemporary. The validity of his continentalist view on film semiotics. First, the texts in question are no less than twenty years old. Further, behind Casetti lies Italian film semiotics. Buckland's book makes a case for contemporary relevance of the work he explores because it manifests the rise of cognitivism in French film semiotics that he places in couterpoint to American film studies' contemporary (i.e., 1980s-1990s) emphasis on narrative film analysis. This exemplified by Bordwell (1986) and others. Casetti does not fit snugly into either group of researchers. Italian semioticians do not ordinarily make direct appeals to cognitive theories. Instead, since the 1960s, and spearheaded by Eco (1976), Italians turned toward Peircean semiotics. They argued, from the outset of Italian film semiotics, that film images themselves called the image's "irritational," and that Barthes (1977) and Metz (1974a: 3-15) held back from visual semiotics — the photo-filmic image as "phenomenological" object. The Italians, such as Eco in developing an "iconic" semiotics (under the rubric of "pansemioticism") and in regarding the photo-filmic image as a "semiotic object," (Muscio and Zemignan 1991)

The differences in approach between French and Italian semiotics from large-scale taxonomic studies (Metz's thrust) were refitted to models stemming from Transformative Generative Semantics (Eco's), which included Casetti in Cognitive Semiotics of Film but, as a promoter of cognitivism everywhere, Buckland does not make it. However, Casetti does make a case on his own behalf in his Theories of Cinema, 1945-1995.

Post-Structuralism's Challenge to Film Semiotics

On the matter of French developments, Cognitive Semiotics of Film has much of value to offer. The post-structuralist impulses that took over film semiotics in the 1970s, giving rise to influential Lacanian-Althusserian film theory, generated powerful schools of interpretation. These impulses spread semiotics throughout Anglophone cinema studies. The post-structuralist movement also had the effect of expanding film semiotics' reserves of methodological patience, conceptual modeling, analytical precision, and its solid base in structural linguistics. Post-structuralism, which had a good long run in cinema studies, both promoted and discredited film semiotics in its own right. The Angophone film academy. To take a signature instance directly involving enunciation: post-structuralist film theory was exported, largely through translations and the expository efforts of the journal Screen, into English-speaking film study where, among other things, it became the theoretical armature of feminist criticism (which thrives there, and elsewhere). Laura Mulvey's "visual" film theory, which chose "elaboration of feminist cinema into a historical cultural" (1975) reconfigured post-structuralist film theory to feminist critical themes and semiotics was directed into interpretation. In particular, enunciation was reformulated and "gendered." The narrative cinema's point-of-view shot figuration, which always figured prominently in discussions of film language, became, following Mulvey's detours into a psychoanalytical etiology and feminist iconology, the "male gaze." Its object became "the-to-be-looked-at-ness of women on screen. In this reformatting of enunciation, film semiotics served as necessary scaffolding and was then removed, rather than elaborated; what arose was a critical discourse of a different kind and no longer film semiotics.

Few Angophone scholars after 1980 directed attention back toward the base that had underwritten such developments, namely Metz's classic formulations (1974a). Fewer still, until Buckland, asked what had happened afterwards inside Inside French film semiotics. Had there been a divorce between semiotics and communication once the spectator's subjectivity came to be seen through the lens of psychoanalysis. The consequent differences, still apparent in the Casetti-Metz debate, were pronounced by Bettini, who cast enunciation as communication, embedded "in the signifying materiality of the text, in the zones occupied and formed by the audiovisual material that, dynamically, produces there a series of acts of signification." (1977; cited in Muscio and Zemignan: 29-30)

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principles and applicability to film semiotics (77-140) and another is Buckland's focused following of the thread reworked by French film scholars. In his commentaries, which expand on the story, Buckland proceeds through a careful account of the models adopted and the way the adoption of cognitivism to film semiotics occurs. The path taken was different from that of the American scholars like Bordwell, Thompson, and Branigan. However, the road toward comparison lies open.

Casetti's Revisionist History of Post-War Film Theory

It looks at first to be another, if also unusually detailed, theory textbook. However, Casetti's Theories of Cinema, 1945-1995 offers a revisionist account and develops a distinct argument, at least to a reader willing to tease it out of the author's proximity. An update and translation of his Teorie del cinema, 1945-1990 (1993), its treatment of post-war film theory departs from most English-language surveys (Lapsley and Westlake 1988; Stam 1998). This departure comes in several stages. The familiar custom is to model histories of film theory as a set of sharp ruptures, for example, between André Bazin and the Cahiers du Cinéma and its final phase of "classical theory" - and Metz's film semiotics - taken as the foundation of contemporary film theory. In most film theory histories, high-relief theoretical positions do noisy battle. The older ones crash and burn, the newer ones prevail. Casetti mutters the war stories and chapters to a quieter corpus of research undertaken. Instead of localized "realist-contemporary" oppositions, Casetti discerns wider differences between "aesthetic-essentialist" theories and "scientific-methodological" theories. He depicts the shift from one set of theories to another as cumulative rather than conflictual. There are battles represented in his account, but lasting consequences come of tectonic shifts of method rather than the eruptions of theoretical polemics. While producing a veritable cascade of too-frequent expositions (i.e., Albert Laffay and Galvano Della Volpe, Jean Mitry, Alberto Abruzzese, Edgar Morin, Pierre Sorlin, et al.), Casetti nonetheless conveys to an attentive reader several things, several things,

Casetti's procedure is also a prejudice, and a covert argument. He gives preference to methodological theories by granting them teleological accumulation. Method develops continuously; theoretically "positions" seem ephememonal. Theorists who famously take energy from the political or ethical currents of any given film (like Carlotta...), Metz's ideal of the homogeneous cinematic object instanced by the narrative code prevailed, and it displaced "aesthetic" theories; semiotics of the cinema quickly, for example, demoted so-called "impressionist" film criticism that one read in Esprit, Cahiers du Cinéma, Sight and Sound, Film Quarterly, or The Nation beneath a new academic genre: the semiotic film analysis. The narrative code subsumed the unresolved problematic of the film image into an ideal structural object, the homologous cinematic paradigm, or syntagmatique. Metz's realized grande syntagmatique of the image track initiated a fresh cycle of debates and research, including Metz's own further work into textuality, systematics, and cybernetics (1974b). Having so many precursors, Metz had interlocutors, too. In his dilation of film semiotics' theoretical moment, Casetti includes Italian semioticians, who did not accept Metz's abandonment of the film image, or its exclusion as a semiotic object, or what Della Volpe called its "conceptual-rational" force and that Eco elaborated in his "difference" as the identity of the film image as a semiotic object, as noted earlier, that brought Metz into debate with Italian semioticians who "elevated the aesthetic object to the rank of semiotic object while...[they] underlined the constitutive heterogeneity of the artistic object." (Muscio and Zemigan 1991: 26) Two traditions of film semiotics sprang from this basic disjuncture.

Metz also found successors. Not all these follow Metz into post-structuralism and Casetti accordingly follows his chapter on the "first semiotics" with a chapter on cognitive and Gestalt theories that, at first, moved only along the edge of film theory debates. It is here, this second stage of his book's covert argument, that Casetti's history dovetails with Buckland's project. Casetti's scope is wider than Buckland's but his argument is diffusive. Psychological theories of perception and image processing, besides psychoanalysis, belong to very diverse eras of film theory. Early Gestalt models served Münsterberg at the dawn of narrative cinema, Aumont and Galvano Della Volpe in their sumptuous, and Merleau-Ponty (1948/1964; 48-62) at the first stage of the European art film. Cognitivist theorists of the 1980s and 1990s seem to appear, then, along a broken but historic continuum of film theory. Casetti can point, for instance, to Jacques Aumont's L'image (1990) as belonging to the long lineage without paradox or distortion; indeed, how Lucien Laborie, for example, also synthesized Casetti can, then, discern cognitivism on film theory's horizon in many places and site it early within film semiotics as well as that...worth's efforts to bring Chomsky into semiotics of cinema (1969). Without really saying so, Casetti is proposing a widened, catholic cognitive semiotics complementing the narrower-point of view procedures. In fact, he devotes numerous pages to writers, like Nick Browne and Edward Branigan, who seek to deal with finer points of narrational and point-of-view procedures. In fact, he devotes almost as many pages to them as he does to Baudry, or to the "suture" theorists Jean-Pierre Oudart and Daniel Dayan who, with Baudry, defined the theoretical parameters within which enunciation was discussed in the 1970s.

Browne and Brunette are interested in narrative as a complex procedure of filmic articulation that guide narrative "comprehension." (Brunet 1992) They what they take from Metz is the modeling of cinematic codes as narrative procedures and they devise a pragmatics of narrative as their topos. It follows that Browne's (1980) analysis of John Ford's Stagecoach as narrative artifice in Cahiers du Cinéma's collective analysis of the same director's Young Mr. Lincoln (in Browne 1990). Oudart and Dayan, like Baudry, contribute models of viewing a narrative film as a matter of "subject positioning," drawing on Lacan's mirror stage. Using this psychoanalytical model, Oudart and Dayan then extend the concept of the oscillation apparatus that moves the viewer between "plenitude" (fullness of the image) and "lack" (the anxious threat of the "reverse field") that can only arrive at alienation and fetishization. In contrast, taking it that the spectator enters into the film-text actively, Browne analyses a point of view passage from a sequence of Stagescoach in detail to demonstrate how "actual" or "rewritten" as the viewer's plural idefificatory attachments, and the viewer's gradual comprehension, modulated by the
both “fields” is in a shot-counter-shot/point-of-view montage array, of a subtle dramaturgy. Differences between suture theory’s model of effects of image reception and film editing and Brown’s micro-analysis of a film’s narratological unfolding illustrated the divided ways that film theory regarded narrative processes. If apparatus and suture theories underwrote denunciation of narrative filmmaking, in doing so they also predetermined how enunciation developed in post-structuralist theory and allowed little need for film analysts to converse with narratologists making fine-grain distinctions among narratological procedures in which viewers became participants in cinematic representation. Writers like Browne and Branigan did hold these conversations, and sought to analyse the viewer’s activity in processing visual images as into narrative information. Casetti inserts his discussion of Browne and others out of historical order, backdating them by almost a decade to undertake a lineage of film analysis that started with Metz. 10 Casetti undeniably distorts strict chronology to imply that post-structuralism is a deviation from film semiotics and not its destined outcome. This is the third stage of his covert argument, and the place where the polemical intent of Casetti’s history of film theory comes into plain view, or at least relatively plain view. Casetti’s and Metz’s work remains reticent to the point of obscuring the point of his discussion. His implied claim, nevertheless, is, at a minimum, that narratology is as valid a resource for film theory as psychoanalysis, a position that held little sway in the period of post-structuralist theory, though this was changing by the early 1980s. What directly connects Casetti to Metz’s “postmodernism.” (Bordwell and Carroll 1996: 3-68) Casetti’s Theories of Cinema is, in this light, a book that bears the signs of enunciation, a position that openly bears the signs of enunciation. By real perceptions.

Theories of Cinema, 1945-1995 shows that the later career of film semiotics is not as limited or as linear as it is portrayed by the standard received history. This has methodological consequences beyond the academic niche of refined film theory’s history. 11 Cinema studies is concerned with cinema as a general phenomenon. From time to time, the academic study of cinema, in this book, Casetti, to Buckland’s Cognitive Semiotics, and that allows him to be grafted on to a branch of cognitive film theory, more than the interpolation of Browne or inclusion of Chateau and Corin, are some of Casetti’s other insertions, for example, Worth’s early attempt to graft Chomsky onto film semiotics. The Return of Enunciation But does Inside the Gaze advance the Metzian problematic of film semiotics? Is Casetti’s reconsideration of enunciation the right gesture? Metz responded very critically to it and the utility and rigour of Casetti’s work remain in question. In Theories of Cinema, Casetti writes: “The 1970s witnessed fierce critical both of the dominant forms and the very concept of representation.” In the 1980s, he says, representation came back, and “to study its current purpose ... to unmask representation” was now added “the material of representation” (Casetti 1996: 272-273) The both-and attitude, typical of Casetti’s reluctance to take a stand, undermines interest in film analysis he claims is renewed by Aumont and Vernet and which shapes the context of his own work. Enunciation returns, Casetti is certain, but where and with weight does it return? His short answer is that enunciation returns us to the site of cinema. And what Casetti will boldly insist is no different from cinematic “communication,” which decisively puts him on the opposite side to those who deeply suspect the “very concept of representation.” Although much shorter, it is no less a prolix and confusing book than Theories of Cinema. Yet one thing is clear about Inside the Gaze: Casetti’s engagement with film semiotics, whatever the concept of the concept re-costumed nor does it serve to detach narrative cinema. Metz himself makes the first aspect clear when this offers a compressed chronology of developments in his preface: Enunciation was studied: (1) to take form and manifest itself; (2) to present itself as text and to offer this specific text in a specific situation (Theories 135). Cinema is a virtuality that, through enunciation, is actualized as a cinematic text. Enunciation explains how “cinema” turns into a “film.” This is enunciation as "text production." What lies ahead of the virtual and the realized, however, are the two further features Casetti attributes to film and these are inside the Gaze’s chief concern: first, a relationship between a set of possibilities and, second, the choices that lead to the realization of a film’s situation of “speaking” with the spectator (240). This relationship is not an empty channel or a matter of a textual arena with the viewer on its periphery. Rather, the realized filmic text "marks the appearance of elements that do not exist in the virtual dimension." These are an agency, and an address to the spectator that temporalizes the manner in which the spectator occupies. Casetti models these elements on the "speech situation," and he equips them with "persons" and personal pronouns that have their direct filmic analogues. One set of differentiation involving enunciation that figured in the 1970s, between texts that openly bear the signs of enunciation (discours) and those that do not (histoire), advance the virtuality of cinema and how the spectator occupies texts that openly bear the signs of enunciation (discours) and those that do not (histoire), advance the virtuality of cinema and how the spectator occupies a filmic text. Casetti expends much of his book building on the idea that enunciation, is actualized as a filmic text. Casetti distinguishes discours and histoire, he means moments of films that manifest themselves in the act of representing and those moments that represent the world directly (histoire). Put simply, the distinction is reduced to three main elements: constitution (or construction), situation (or placement), and possible self-referentiality. Casetti offers much of Inside the Gaze unfolding this set of condensed definitions and analyzing specific moments of their manifestation. However, he is chiefly concerned with the latter two and with proposing formal cinematic usages, and his applications through analysis-exemplifications of sequences (never whole films), to develop a schema whose version of combinations and permutations fill out the book. As he says of the collection Metz cites above, Communications 35 (1983) represented the new round of enunciation in cinema studies in the early 1980s and it reopened the discussion of cinematic enunciation in a linguistic register. Casetti’s discussion of this new initiative clarifies some general practical points of his own position. He believes that these writers follow Jean-Paul Simon (Théories 240-242) who analyses passages in the Marx Brothers movies where enunciation seems to tear the fabric of the film apart. Groucho’s off-screen voice to the viewers, for instance, do not occur as given by the closed fictional world but announce themselves as “something the text produces” for the viewer. When signaling to the viewer with his wisecracks, Groucho calls attention to herself from the screen. Casetti
associates such passages with those moments in Hollywood backstage musicals wherein the situation of the film viewer is aligned (ordinarily through montage) with the perspectives of intrusive linguistic audiences watching a song and dance number. He takes these moments to be the places where the enunciative process leaps into the foreground and becomes distinguishable. In principle, however, such moments are of a piece with a film’s textual production as a whole. At every moment a film, he claims, “directs its location or, more broadly, the ideal position of an individual film taken from the analyst’s point of view” (inside the Gaze). He argues in his astute discussion of Metz’s theorizing of the “singular textual system” (i.e., that which Metz calls “displacement”) the claim that the “address-to-the-camera of Denys Casetti is operatively equivalent to semiosis in the place of the gaze, an enunciator, Casetti does not make beyond the “enunciative frame” to what Casetti implies. Enunciation can only be seen in the site of suggestions that, to a greater or lesser degree, the viewer must complete. Moreover, enunciation never appears as such nor does the subject that it implies. Enunciation can only be seen in the enoncé — recognized through fragments (“a series of indices internal to the film”). These fragments (or enunciates) Casetti recognizes as “prostheses” or “prosthetic gazes.” The gaze organizes a perspective, a place, a point of view, a pivot around which to organize images and sounds and give them coordinates and form. The gaze, then, is a category of formal operations and the gaze does not appear as such but is indelible in the sense of pointing or indicating. Hence, when we want to put a person in the place of the gaze, an enunciator, for instance, one that does not mean an author who issues a set of statements but a set of textual-visual operations. The gaze is not exactly some optical point of view — and that fact will entail making a whole typology of operations — but is linguistic, the sign of a “linguistic operation” roughly equivalent to a “voice” and an indicator of subjectivity (inside 199). However, the gaze does not deconstruct location or, more broadly, the ideal position of an observer witnessing the scene projected on the screen. So, Casetti (19-20) concludes: These alternatives have profound roots: before referring to either a technical installation, point of view emerges at the very moment when the enunciation underlines its own enunciative operation, by orienting the enoncé toward a point different from where it was constituted, and thus establishing within in very center an opposition... The enoncé is constituted somewhere, and now it is constituted at another point, and this entails a double activity: the subject of enunciation divides into an enunciator and an enunciata. The subject of enunciation exhibits itself more or less openly (as in Groucho’s asides) and installs itself in the enoncé. It can delegate its work to figures in the filmic text, whether a character or a camera movement, and there is no fundamental difference between those examples where enunciation is openly expressed and those multitudes of film passages “where enoncé no longer calls attention to itself but becomes preoccupied with its own contents.” (21) So, while there are cases of “enunciative encroachment” when a character looks directly into the camera, cinematic events can and most often do pass beyond the “enunciative frame” to what Casetti terms the “environment” made up of the whole filmic text. Hence, Casetti does not make distinctions that place histoire and discours in opposition but instead produces a schema of relations that he terms “enunciative writing” (inside viewer, and to these he assigns pronoun-functions, in effect positions of filmic-narration relations. In his discussion of the Casetti-Metz debate, Buckland regards enunciation to be a problem Metz casts differently than Casetti. Casetti’s account of the environment between his “code semiotics” and his “text semiotics” there is an option likely to be exercised by film analysts who come under the influence of Eco, and especially The Role of the Reader, as Metz himself comments (Inside the Gaze xii). Once again the Italian semiotics connection produces a difference in approach. When Casetti has his second option as his own approach, its validity stands on two bases: one, the “internal maneuvers” (Bettini’s “ordering principle”) a film has at its disposal to produce cinematic coherence, despite the “material diversity” of cinema and, two, the “contributions of the spectators who shape the meaning of what they see.” (147-148) For Casetti, cinema is not only a series of enunciatory or imaginative confrontations but is a dialectic of cinematic codes and, a fortiori, enunciation never takes the role of providing it. Instead, Metz argues that a textual system arises as an operation that transforms codes through their mutual competition, or what Metz calls “displacement.” (1974b: 99-125) He is explanationistic of the enunciatory activity among subcodes comprising a code’s regional virtuality - when a film achieves concretion that gives rise to its textual system. Metz regards this process as filmic writing.14 Casetti takes it that in placing a conflictual idea of filmic writing beside his structuralist modeling of cinematic codes (e.g., the gr unlé synagnétique), Metz opens a division in film semiotics. He and, later, Vincenzo Bettini’s models of cinematic codes (modeled on language) being simply utilized in a single filmic utterance (a text’s parole) — a model of a virtual-to-realized progression straight through selection to cinematic realization. Language and Cinema passes into what Casetti regards as a “second semiotics” (sometimes termed “text semiotics”) that provides the language for speaking. However, Casetti discerns two options: the first posits “tangentially infinite productivity.” This option is instantiated by Marie-Clair Ropars’s adaptation of a theory of film writing in her analyses and her discovery of “the ascent of the unstoppable moment of signification.” (Theories 146) The second option is “to define the film texts as a coherent world of signified present.” (Inside the Gaze) 147-148) Casetti regards as a “second semiotics” (sometimes termed “text semiotics”) that provides the language for speaking. 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Because of their joint history in film theory, reflexivity and enunciation tend to overlap and this question remains relevant today. Both concepts guide film analysis to indicate how films go about the process of foregrounding the production of their significance, and of opening themselves to a viewer’s comprehension, and this is identified with discours. Films, like classical Hollywood narrative films, that do not seem to open themselves in this way, parade themselves as histoire – as “story” without discursive marks, without marking a point of emission - supposedly lack a reflexive dimension. On this account, discours must be regarded as a deliberate gesture a film makes. Enunciation is an act a film performs and not a condition of cinematic textuality. The joining of enunciation and reflexivity in this way arises from enunciation’s assignment to double role in both accounting for how a text actualizes the “film” Casetti offers an orientation toward its internal meaning-production to the viewer. In practice, many critics sever these roles, however, and do not integrate reflexivity and internal articulation as a matter of theory. They use self-reflexivity as a critical criterion. However, neither Casetti nor Metz may be counted among critics who differentiate the two dimensions. It seems to Casetti that the viewer completes the film utterance prompted by the internal organization of enunciation a film performs indicates that films enunciate as a matter of course, by their nature as narrating artifacts. So far Metz concurs, and refers, for example, to any film as a “filmic text.” Metz, however, uncouples the double role of enunciation and reflexivity which, in his view, draws from linguistic analogy and from communication.

Backlund finds this uncoupling worked out in Metz’s (1982) “Story/Discourse (A Note on Two Kinds of Voyeurism).” The distinction between histoire and discours, which Metz seems to accept, would seem to make deixis fundamental since deixis marks the boundary of a speaker’s or writer’s space of emission. However, Metz precludes deixis because of the way he construes cinematic specificity on material grounds. In a very influential formulation, Metz associates discours in visual arts with voyeurism matched with exhibitionism, and histoire with a voyeurism that misses its meeting with the exhibitionist. This means the exhibitionist is a relay of the other’s exteriority. In theatre, performer (exhibitionist) and spectator (voyeur) can recognize one another because two “looks” are co-present in the same physical situation. Theatre is a particular kind of “speech situation” defined by the co-presence of performer and spectator; however formalized and therefore weaker theatre might make the situation in comparison with two friends talking on a street corner.

The cinema situation is fundamentally different. Metz (1974a: 4-15; 1982:1-87) posits a radical “segmentation of spaces” between the film viewer and the screen as a material condition of cinema. The film performer is recorded and production constructs how a spectator is positioned in the film. The cinema situation is inherently voyeuristic: we look into a diegetic world that cannot look back. The situation is inherently non-communicational. The viewer-voyeur in a movie theatre cannot expect any recognition from the screen because the exhibitionist is materially absent. Luca Turner struts her stuff in a midriff-bearing two-piece for John Garfield’s benefit in The Postman Always Rings Twice but Turner will never be an exhibitionist to me. This is likewise true of Groucho or Jean-Pierre Léaud in Godard’s La Chinoise, or Liv Ullman in Ingmar Bergman’s Persona, films often cited as examples of cinematic discours. These performers are absent when making a film spectator or directly addressing the camera. There is no deixis in a motion picture. The object of the voyeur’s gaze cannot be self-reflexive in the sense of deixis – meaning a dedicated set of signs that situate the exchange between two persons – because films know nothing of the spectator’s presence.

Metz characterizes narrative film as normatively historie for it does not possess deixis markers and is a spectacle unaware of being watched. The cinema is “monodirectional.” (“Impersonal,” 127) Metz posits the cinema spectator who is present but does not manifest his presence in any respect – because a film will never (can never) respond to him (150-151). “Traces” of its semiotic production are another story, and so films can be discours but only in a different fashion. Reflexivity does occur in film, but its thrust is inward: the text bends itself toward self- reflection.

Metz sees the filmic text as any film when examined from the perspective of the analyst. He does not regard reflexivity to be a special case nor does he petition special devices to account for discours. Rather it is a quality of filmic textuality that can be brought to light by analysis. In “Impersonal Enunciation,” Metz substitutes two other categories – “enunciative” and “metalanguage” for deixis. Metalanguage is the necessary capacity of a language to refer to itself. It is not an autonomous instrument or special feature of language. Backlund uses the example of the sentence, “You should never say ‘never’.” The first appearance of “never” belongs to object language, which denotes states of affairs outside language, while the second refers to language itself, which is what metalanguage does. The difference lies in the denotative function a word performs, and, here in the second instance, the reflexive function and not a special feature of the word “never.” Metz applies the same principle to film: “Cinema does not have a closed set of enunciative signs, but refers to other potential frames of reference – all textual devices” (1:147) Mutatis Mutandis other types of cinematic construction can have enunciative purposes – for example subjective framing. In this perspective, Hitchcock’s Rear Window is not radically different from Michael Snow’s avant-garde film Wavelength. Nor is it potentially less self-reflective discours than La Chinoise.

Likewise, Metz poses anaphor as another alternative to deixis. Using the sentences “John is ill. He will not be coming to work today,” Backlund describes anaphor as a reference made to information already contained in an utterance. deixis refers to relations between linguistic signs and the real context of speaking. Anaphora are not dependent on the moment of speaking but are features of writing and signs internal to a text. They are contained within the utterance without referring to the context of the act of communicating and without requiring special signs. For Metz, then, reflexivity in film is a compositional choice a filmmaker makes in constructing a film text, and not a puncturing of cinematic construction. The influence of Metz’s typology in “Story/ Discourse” on post-structuralist film theory cannot easily be overestimated. The model of cinematic voyeurism proved powerfully suggestive to feminist critical theories, for example. But, more important is the specification that the spectator, because he is not involved in a communication, can be understood as holding a subject position on the other side of the screen where the point of entry into the filmic space lies along a “phantasmatic” pathway of the camera’s work. For this reason, Metz argues that the
viewer's real "identification" in cinema is with the camera. For this reason he repeats, contra Casetti, if anyone speaks "I" in film, it is the viewer, and not the film text. In contrast, Casetti posits that the film text "says "I" to a viewer "you," the addressee of the image-discourse, and from this base Casetti creates a set of permutations, which we examine below. Casetti proposes a kind of democracy of participants on both sides of the screen who collaborate in making the meaning of a film. The 1970s theorists see cinema as a kind of dictatorship of bourgeois illusionism. Classical narrative film seems to efface the viewer into discourses into histoire. The world seems to "tell itself" and this sustains the "classic realist film text" with all the imposture processes of ideological "naturalizations" (Barthes 1972) that entails. In the ideological critiques developed by Cinéthique and Cahiers du Cinéma (Theories 185-197), this process came to be seen as an ideologically coercive machinery of illusion. The "modernist" (or "progressive") film seems necessarily to behave like a semiotic analysis of cinema because it acts to unfold discursive properties into open view and the path enunciation takes into reflexivity also forms a kind of resistance to the cinematic dictatorship of histoire. The modernist film "writes" itself and the viewer "reads." The grammar of the filmic text, often used this way, distinguishes films like La Chinoise that brought into view its self-constructive processes as an enunciative feature.

The reason why enunciation, constructed on such a distinction, once took an important place in film semiotics is clear. It explains how, through internal formal procedures, filmmakers might qualify conventional or ordinary narrational conditions. This schema is set out with respect to positions of the camera. What Casetti terms "enunciative process eludes ready application of the basic typology of enunciation has often played in contemporary film theory, Casetti is uncommonly generous toward theoretical critiques developed by (at least) two moments, the first showing a shared kind of viewing of screen events is entailed. In any case, his model takes the viewer's point of view as necessary weaver of the film's threads. The film is an "organism subsisting in a discourse" (Casetti 1982). It directs itself to "someone who can be expected to show signs of understanding, a subtle accomplice to the character that appears on the screen, a partner who can be given a task and who will carry it out in good faith." Inside 5

The basic typology of Casetti's model. It is characteristic of, but hardly conclusive, Casetti's "interpretive approach," necessarily shifts the viewer from a film's object of study, when the enunciator appears.

The Situation of the Spectator

The question then becomes: How does the spectator cross the barrier of the screen? On material grounds, Metz denies the viewer ever does so. Casseti's broad answer is that the film invites the spectator into its operations. Slightly less broad, one could say that for Casetti film is not only a material medium, which implies its completeness as a technical apparatus, but is as well – and crucially – narration and narration, Cassetti believes (as do many American cognitive narratologists) that film is or should be a complex but only to be completed. Although he offers assertions, Cassetti provides no sufficient argument for such a position (as does Bordwell [1986]). We are left to construe, on the basis of his observations discussed earlier, that he would be ready to do so. Instead, Casetti focuses the question procedurally:

How does a film say "you"? With this way of posing the problem, saying that a film "crosses" "in itself a space ready to receive whoever it is addressed to," Casetti invokes the theory of deixis, which he calls "categories of person." When Casetti begins by analysing some examples (e.g., Bitter Rice, Marvín Gardens, and Vent d'est) where the film seems to address the viewer as you directly, he discovers that, in fact, films do not really do this. As much as it may seem, it is only that the direct address has been made to some belatedly revealed internal diegetic presence, and has thus been folded back into the énoncé. Such passages represent cases of characters looking directly at the camera and breaking a famous taboo of conventional cinema and Casetti regards the passages as "II.

But he fits them into a scheme which is not discontinuous because "a film bears permanent marks of enunciation" that "accompany the film all along its development," and the viewer is one of these marks. So, even taboo-breaking is no reason to exclude the "metadiscursive" to a zone of special discursive acts (reflexivity as an avant-garde gesture); this taboo-breaking takes us to the centre of enunciation as the constative act any narrative film performs as a film. This is why his scheme concerns degrees of explicitness with respect to enunciation.

The basic typology of Inside the Gaze is a four-part schema of shots that correspond to associations I, you, he, and their combinations and permutations. This schema is set out with respect to positions of the camera. What Casetti terms "equilibrium" is the filmic utterance itself (so, he), which corresponds to histoire. It consists of what Casetti terms the "subjective views" that narration itself provides. But, because these objective views presuppose an enunciator (an) and a destination (a you, the interlocutor), their presences still remain implicit and operative even if the film is, by definition, presenting unmediated shots of the diegetic world. Next is interpellation, when I and you are subjected to a filmic discourse (as when Berthollet in the opening of Bitter Rice or Swordfish). Here the spectator is "set aside" – a you "installed opposite the I combined with a he," the on-screen character. The third type is "subjective shot" – the proper point of view of editing figuring – composed of (at least) two moments, the first showing a character's act of looking and the next the viewer being subjected to it. Finally, the fourth type is shot and you (the viewer) become tightly aligned.

The fourth type Casetti terms an unreal objective shot, drawing his example from a Buxby Berkeley-choreographed passage from The Kid from Spain in which dancers form one of Berkeley's famous abstract patterns shown from an extreme high angle. Casetti's point is that the viewer surrenders a plausible realistic perspective on the spectacle to assume an unreal but objective position occupied by the camera rather than by an on-screen character. Buckland (Cognitive 63) provides a helpful diagram of Casetti's basic typology so far:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Shot (or View)</th>
<th>Addresssee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>Witness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpellation</td>
<td>Spectator set aside</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjective</td>
<td>Identification with character</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unreal Objective</td>
<td>Identification with camera</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Casetti regards it as unproblematical that films can shift among these enunciative registers from moment to moment. It is one of the improvements of his model over suture theory that he regards no whole film as ever constituting one moment of enunciation. This flexibility, however, introduces other problems. Even his analyses grow complex and, as he proposes to explain passages and show how a sequence of shots allows us to experience cinematic address, his typology nonetheless remains strictly bound to his typology of shots correlated with pronoun correlates. Rather than modeling a film's narrational discourse, or textual system, Casetti restricts himself to one-to-one associations between localized cinematic configurations and personal-pronoun analogies. A complex set of analytical problems arises with a film like Hitchcock's Rear Window that thrwarts such associations. Here the palpable co-presence of Hitchcock with the (potentially using his own phrase) and (the optical) point of view of the protagonist and the identifieric engagement of the viewer are modulated programatically, and with comparative simplicity. Yet, the film's enunciative process eludes ready application of Casetti's model. It is characteristic of, but hardly unique to, Hitchcock's cinema: that the text's reflective and ironic play (as well as the viewer's) is part of the collective constitution of the viewer are complexly interwoven. But how the two phenomena are to be aligned is made harder to grasp, not clarified, by "Inside the Gaze without considerable guesswork. There have been various successful solutions, like Brandler's (1992), dealing with these analogical
problems to render uncomfortable comparisons one might make with Casetti’s principle analytical chapters, “The Figure of the Spectator” and “The Place of the Spectator.”

In a narrative film, Casetti says, we find characters and we hypothesize an originator of the diegesis, which we often take to be an author or implied author. Sometimes characters and author diverge, however. There are three basic levels Casetti devises to map this divergence. In a film, a character is not necessarily the infallible narrator and we can take its “commentary” to qualify as faithful incarnations of the agent which narrates a story information through dialogue and flashbacks.

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Casetti errs in suggesting that such arrangements “denote no real and coherent relations.” (35) Branigan more correctly models the arrangement as “levels” in a hierarchy that allows film narration to shift discourse up and down a scale of enunciative platforms according to degrees of points of origin; i.e., deeper into, or further out to the edge of, the diegesis, beyond which a final narrational determination awaits, with “the scene itself” (when taken as part of the enunciation itself).

Despite allowing for subordination or coordination, Casetti does not, at first, seem to recognize middle ranges between “dialogism” and “absolute homogeneity.” There is a lingering “binarism” behind his democratic “dialogism.” Under suggestive (and mounting) pressure stemming from his practical applications, however, the middle range grows and becomes dense with distinctions. A flaw in his exposition is that Casetti never systematizes their relations.

When he applies his pronoun-analyses to his shot typology in the chapter “The Place of the Spectator,” he joins his first four-part diagram (rendered above by Buckland) to a pronoun model based on that of Metz. In the course of his analyses, he recognizes “gazes” and begins with the objective shot, “an immediate recording of the facts,” and says that here “the enunciator and the enunciatee exist at a level of perfect equality, finding support in a point of view which reveals only what it cannot hide: the énoncé.” And so, “factual” gaze grows and becomes dense with distinctions. A flaw in his exposition is that Casetti never systematizes their relations.

In the first passage, which includes the titles, consists of Casetti’s “metadiegetic” narration, since it includes the names of the film’s makers, etc., that we can take as originators of the film as a whole. The second is the (strongly) implied enunciator with the camera as a pivot point for a move inside and outside the protagonist’s apartment, and visually providing expository information that subsequent segments will elaborate. The third, in Casetti’s words, “personifies a second point of view at the interior of the mise en scène – the ‘second’ in the sense of alternative and subordinate.” (35-36) This second level is Casetti’s “metadiegetic narrator” unlike the previous two figures because he is entirely confined to the story space of the film. He is not a “full delegate” of the enunciation since his power to prompt shots from his perspective can be revoked, can be made to alternate with objective views, etc. With the appearance of a metadiegetic figure, the film’s discourse becomes “plural” and potentially “fragmentary.” In fact, we could, a bit fancifully, regard the first dialogue of Hitchcock’s protagonist to be his fractious protest against the undesired situation in which he is caught and enunciator have placed him, and the three sequences taken together perhaps initiate the divergence between the protagonist “Hitchcock, the author” and “Hitchcock, the enunciator.”

Now, this is a film in which “Hitchcock” is unusually reticent, and the divergences from the protagonist are not numerous. Nonetheless, they remain notable and are strategized placed in what follows, as always with this director’s films.

Casetti remarks that the two types of narration, the enunciatory and the intra-diegetic, will always find some way to unite either through coordination or subordination. While the enunciator loots the intra-diegetic narrator a capacity to narrate portions of the story, the power can also reveal the enunciatee’s highly homogenous and in Hitchcock’s films often pointedly, as in Psycho. In Rear Window, the coordination is overall very close throughout what develops into a murder investigation the protagonist conducts from his apartment. A similar but more complicated case is Siodmak’s film noir, The Killers. After a prelude, which includes a murder, the detective, Riordan, establishes a highly-organized relation with the enunciator. The characters he interviews in order to piece together the plot behind the murder that opens the film are clearly subordinate to Riordan. They provide narrative information through dialogue and flashbacks.

Casetti now uses this model to indicate where the spectator were present at a scene) or a character’s glance off-screen prompt the intercut long shots (rendered above by Buckland) to a pronoun and enunciator [as in the look into the camera], but rather, between character and enunciature in a synthesis achieved through a single act (I make both you and her gaze) as a juxtaposition of two shots or two ‘objective’ moments neither of which, taken separately, are capable of revealing neither the protagonist nor the enunciator. (49)

The pronoun analogues so far: Objective view: “you and I, we gaze” Interpellation: “you and I, we gaze at you” Subjective view: “I make you gaze, you equally as her”

The last type in this scheme, the unreal objective shot, receives more elaborate treatment, because here “the activity of the enunciator and enunciatee are foregrounded, imposed in an obvious manner.” (50) For Casetti, apparently, in an even more obvious manner than he had previously reserved for interpellation (like Groucho’s asides), these are passages, often just single shots, that cannot be motivated by a witness (as if the spectator were present at a scene) or a character’s position in the fiction’s spaces. Only a camera can occupy an extreme high-angle shot, as in Casetti’s example from The Kid from Spain. (Hitchcock’s high-angle shot ending the UN sequence from North by Northwest or any number of the enunciators of Brian De Palma’s films would serve as well) Here, the enunciator and the enunciatee announce their complicity with each other… ‘what you see, thanks to me, is that I alone am able to see: thus we see.” (50)

The point of this exercise, which can be taken as Casetti developing a typology to register how prothetic “propositions” are marked by the cinematic discourse, is to explain how the four various shot types “activate the audio-visual discourse” in various ways of saying “you.” They all make an invitation to the viewer to cross to the screen and take up a position, a pivoting perspective on the spectacle, and they engender an enunciator (Hitchcock) and, through the turning of the page, perform another function as well. They anchor images and sounds to “a single point.” What is the importance of such a single point? Using an old expression, Casetti refers to “blocked” and “blocking” structures. He explains that images have to find a structure and these modes of address operate as the context in which “textual fragility” (propositions) are marked by this necessary. The first is that an image must be found along a trajectory between the enunciator as a whole and the viewer, and so images must be placed at a certain discursive point. The other reason why they are “blocked” through mode of address is that one option precludes the others: an enunciator option, say the subjective shot figure, bars any dialogue with an off-screen array. Thus types of shots seem to organize whole passages, at least to the level of the subsequence. This is Casetti’s rough equivalent to Metz’s concept of “displacement” that we discussed through Casetti’s commentary above. One assumes, or guess, that certain editing figures common to narrative films, like the alternating syntagm (also termed parallel editing), are likely to be folded into the objective view since no character can enjoy the privilege of simultaneously occupying two spaces. Casetti now uses this model to indicate how (1) the relation the viewer is “propositioned” to assume and (2) how the attitude the viewer will take is shaped to the images shown in any passage set up by filmic constructions and (3) how
Hitchcock's prelude propositions the viewer to maintain, and never to abandon, a certain reserve toward "identification" with the protagonist's perspective. This sense of a layered pronoun proposition is not exactly the way Case
tti proceeds. As his detailed discussion of Lang's Fury shows (67-73), Casetti's analyses find alternations and perhaps completions but find no stratified
similarities in enunciation, which is to say, no hierarchies in the narratological process, and surprisingly, little room for a viewer's divided
loyalties. This likely precludes his account of enunciation from aiding us in the film since, beyond a certain point tracing alternations, and the ensuing complexity of their interactions, make analytical description impossibly
unwieldy.

The second example – and Casetti cycles through all four of his shot types – is impossible objective view. The second example, after the descriptively
exempted crane shot over the Atlanta railway
station filled with the Confederate wounded and dead, or Hitchcock's resort to inserting an aerial shot during the "gas station" attack in The Birds,
there is, Casetti observes, a sudden "expansion of the visual field" that exceeds the tasks of providing narrative information. Putting aside the problem of determining what narrative function the viewer's scanning
position exceeds narrative function, Casetti argues that the crane shot arises from the point of view of the enunciator who "fabricates it." What distinguishes such a shot from the objective view is that the enunciator and enunciatee are
figurativized and the énoncé reveals its technical
armature. Gone with the Wind's crane shot is palpable, as is a High-contrast black
dot shot in The Birds is an open display of "special
effects." In such shots the "spectator is led to
identify with the machine in operation rather than a
detached and exterior eye." (57) For this reason, Casetti regards impossible objective views as another type of "meta deductive" knowing for the viewer, and that "believing" is in this case of
relevance to "identification" on another level. (71)

In the case of interpellation, the viewer becomes involved in a paradox. An alternation between objective views and direct address to the camera "punctures and supports the
narrative." (59) Casetti chooses the "Hoe Down"
passage from a musical, Babes on Broadway, where the interpellations come fast and furiously but they are very brief, almost perfunctive in effect. One would wonder if the same paradox applies to Groucho's
asides or to Bitter Rice or To Die For. One wonders, too, how interpellation can be said to "support" the narrative when breaking the taboo of looking into
the camera seems only to "puncture." His example, like others he uses for this mode of adhesion, entails a war and a viewer that
back into another mode. Here, as usual in his
examples, objective views enfold the interpellating
shots he cites from the "Hoe Down" number.

Another type can do the enfolding too. In
Swordfish, a "bullet time" montage follows Travolta's interpellative monologue, which is a contemporary instance of an impossible objective view. The view
propositions for Casetti is that when cinematographic representation becomes self-conscious, it is the film's self-
construction that is figurativised. Not surprisingly, this is a privilege of interpellation that Casetti
tends toward "identification" with the protagonist's
attitude. "In Rear Window we recognize that he is the dominant figure of our reception of the film and its effects, and that the film's destination and become as perturbed as he when
his neighbors fail to notice him doing so), and
because the plot could not continue if the
protagonist did not keep looking (and the
neighbors fail to notice him doing so), and
looking for the camera, which positional
aid allows him to do. However, which type of enunciative operation are such passages within Case
tti's framework? The lenses provide a kind of impossible objective view because they reveal close-ups of the
neighbors and expose a mechanical armature, like the crane shot in Gone with the Wind, though in his instance, which misleads the viewer to
provide a satisfactory criterion for distinguishing or combining his own types, as this example from
Rear Window attests.

Casetti uses another Hitchcock film, Vertigo, to develop his account of the subjective
view. If, as we have seen, he indicates that impossible objective and interpellation tend toward the
discovery of image, which misleads the viewer,
showing images seen through a character's eyes, the film depicts the point from where it is
understood… figurativising its own destination… [and] the enunciator becomes confused with a
component of the énoncé, acquiring the status of observer…[the presumed spectator of the film
merges into a character, adopting the latter's perspective and substituting its own viewpoint.] (61) Some of the claims here are uncertain. In
the example taken from Vertigo, the terror of falling from a great height is restricted and shared
by the protagonist and the viewer but there is no
sense that we are "confused" with him since we are
seated comfortably while he is danging over an
alley. In Rear Window things are more complicated, for nothing, the protagonist, like
us, remains comfortably seated and watchful.
Nonetheless, we may not become confused with
any part of the énoncé – we can reserve our
perspective - nor wholly take on the protagonist's
attitudes. "In Rear Window we recognize that he is the dominant figure of our reception of the film and its effects, and that the film's
destination and become as perturbed as he when
his progress toward a solution of the murder
mystery is postponed. And, in Vertigo Casetti
could find strong examples of what he calls
confusion in the immensely redundant passages
during which the protagonist secretly follows the
heroes around San Francisco, falls in love and
then lost, as if he were slumbering as someone else. In this case, the deception he experiences becomes our own until, in a sudden
enunciation shift to the woman's perspective, our
deception (but not his) is exposed.

The solution to such "textual" distinctions does not appear in Casetti's scheme in the way we
have just extrapolated. We may generally wonder if some part of the film's plot depends on the
analyst's discernment. The fact that his
detailed analyses are convoluted and depend on
Casetti's own considerable discernment thickens
this suspicion. In the discussion of "The Geography of the Spectator," Casetti adds another
layer, the last to be discussed here. Casetti
loosens his binds between spectatorship and his
pronoun features. They do "punctuate and support" the
énoncé as Casetti suggests, and surely figurativise
the film's self-construction. These moments also
puncture the narrative because they wrench us from
our unselfconscious absorption in the plot's
intrigue to attend to our own voyeuristic acts of
watching when the active presence of prose
of intent looking heaves into our view. The
passages also support the narrative, however,
because the plot could not continue if the
protagonist did not keep looking (and the
neighbors fail to notice him doing so), and
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by the protagonist and the viewer but there is no
sense that we are "confused" with him since we are
seated comfortably while he is danging over an
alley. In Rear Window things are more complicated, for nothing, the protagonist, like
us, remains comfortably seated and watchful.
Nonetheless, we may not become confused with
any part of the énoncé – we can reserve our
perspective - nor wholly take on the protagonist's
attitudes. "In Rear Window we recognize that he is the dominant figure of our reception of the film and its effects, and that the film's
destination and become as perturbed as he when
his progress toward a solution of the murder
mystery is postponed. And, in Vertigo Casetti
could find strong examples of what he calls
confusion in the immensely redundant passages
during which the protagonist secretly follows the
heroes around San Francisco, falls in love and
then lost, as if he were slumbering as someone else. In this case, the deception he experiences becomes our own until, in a sudden
enunciation shift to the woman's perspective, our
deception (but not his) is exposed.

The solution to such "textual" distinctions does not appear in Casetti's scheme in the way we
have just extrapolated. We may generally wonder if some part of the film's plot depends on the
analyst's discernment. The fact that his
detailed analyses are convoluted and depend on
Casetti's own considerable discernment thickens
this suspicion. In the discussion of "The Geography of the Spectator," Casetti adds another
layer, the last to be discussed here. Casetti
loosens his binds between spectatorship and his
pronoun
The problems with Casetti’s model that Metz frames come down to a more fundamental issue. Metz casts them as three objections: anthropomorphism, artificial use of linguistic concepts and the transfer of filmic enunciation into real communicative relationships (“Impersonal,” 151). The anthropological error lies in confusing situations with personalities. For Metz, a film may set up a “target” but this is not precisely the same as an enunciator (or addressee). When a film is shown, Metz agrees, we may assume the presence of a viewer but the filmmaker is not there. The filmmaker and the enunciative utterance did have an encounter, in the making of the film; the viewer only has her encounter with the text. There is no you or I present. Casetti sets out for enunciative poles “that call for embodiment.” In fact, says Metz, the film is the enunciator, the film as the source (of significance) of acting (on the viewer), of an activity with an orientation. So, “what the spectator faces, what the spectator has to deal with, is the film.” (150) Casetti’s anthropologising leads him from “the first person of the verb in language” to posing his enunciator as a type of person involved in some exchange with the viewer. The slide lands into confusion between “[t]wo heterogeneous orders of reality” (thing and persons). (151) The misapplication of linguistic concepts is, then, that Casetti assigns personal pronouns to agents when in fact, “the enunciator” is incarnated in the only available body, the body of the text, that is a thing, which will never be called on... which is not in charge of any exchange with some You.” (150) Film does not permit two personal “presences” because the author has vanished behind the production and “the spectator, who is present, does not manifest his presence in any respect because the film can never respond to him.” (150-151) The error is the familiar one encountered in enunciation theories of film: Casetti’s false analogy between natural language exchanges and cinematic representations of exchange — he confuses the cinema situation with real language communication. Metz’s further criticisms detail the subordinate features of the basic cinematic situation with respect to point of view, the role of acting (on the spectator), of an activity with embodiment. In fact, says Metz, the enunciative theory implicitly based on the inherent indeterminacy of texts. The evidence is his refusal to consider relations between the text and its extra-textual contexts productive of its structure, as well as in the way he reserves some of Casetti’s deictic formulae, thereby reducing them indeterminately (Cognitive 73).

Casetti might well agree with Buckland judging from the section of Theories of Cinema where he discusses two possible tendencies in Metz’s later “textual semiotics” and assumes that one more directly arising from it does incline toward “indeterminacy”; he calls it “tangentially infinite productivity.” However, as Buckland makes Buckland’s supposedly more direct evidence seriously. In structural analysis, the point is (Buckland explains) to model a structure whose effects are perceived whereas the structure that determines them is not perceived. The problem with the method is that “it diminishes the text, reduces it to a preconceived structural grammar.” (73) The method is falsified because it produces “discrepancies” which prevent it from reducing to a structural grammar.

There are two problems with Buckland’s view of Metz. First, Metz is not a thoroughgoing structuralist, as Casetti shows in Theories of Cinema, but only in the parts of his semiotics when he seeks to establish the cinematic code. He becomes a kind of linguist when he deals with single textual systems. There, it seems to me, Metz leaves ample room in his theory for relexivity of texts and ways in which they might therefore reflect on their own construction. He hardly diminishes the text and, in fact, Casetti insists that Metzian “text semiotics” makes the textual system much denser than allowing for some unifying principle to control its productivity. Following in the path of Eco, Casetti’s enunciation theory seeks, among other things, to control textual productivity, blocking its excessive (or "infinite") semiosis and bringing it into the circuit of communication. To suggest Metz is a deconstructionist, or at least that Language and Cinema are oriented to the prospect of a kind of indeterminate analysis is nonetheless different from suggesting that Metz’s refusal to accept a theory of “extra-textual contexts” makes him a deconstructivist. The different problem, which Casetti opens up following the line of Italian film semiotics, is that Metz does not consider the text’s system to be built on a communicative principle of internal coherence; the film viewer is its destination and completion; therefore, the film text opens communicatively toward interpretive acts. What remains murky is the question of whether and, if so, how, a text has to be opened — whether through some version of deixis — to a viewer’s “embodied” response in order to possess a cogency of its textual system and whether the cinematic film needs to be hypothetically amenable to analysis and/or interpretation, or comprehension of explicit referential meaning. Casetti insists his is a semiotic model of communication but develops no model of interpretation. Judging from his often tangled sample analyses, Inside the Gaze is no model of
It seems that Casetti has rewritten the book, then, at least three times.

7. Casetti also introduces another category he terms "field theories," by which he meansmiscellaneous, like sociology of film.

8. Exceptional to this respect is Raymond Bellour, who preceded Metz in combining semiotic "code" analysis and psychoanalysis in his studies of passages of Hitchcock's films (1979/2020) and this should be mentioned because while Bellour is perhaps the best known of Metz's younger colleagues in Anglophone film studies, he is not the most typical.


10. But which Metz recognized, as he does in "Crossing over the Alps and the Pyrenees," xi-xii (Casetti 1998).

11. Nonetheless, as a contribution to the current trend to enrich the history of film theory overall, alongside the work of Abel, Rosen, Carroll, and others, Casetti's book is to be valued. Making "denser" accounts of film theory's past makes it a more flexible and usable tradition of reflection on cinema.

12. It is impossible to portray any sense of this confusion in a short note, beyond indicating that, in the last 20 years, McLuhanism, auteurism, Bazinian realism, a variety of aesthetic modernisms, cybernetics, the existing variety of "classical film theory," the extant histories of cinema, communications theory, all clamped to define the discipline of cinema studies. Gene Youngblood's Expanded Cinema (1970) conveys the hyperbolic variety of these theoretical enthusiasms, which Youngblood shares.


14. On the problems of subcodes and displacement, see Bordwell (1992) who suggests an empirical history of film practices that can isolate select subcodes in their periods of predominance (for example the subcodes of editing, cutting or panning to reframe an action on screen in the late 1920s). John Mowitt takes a much dimmer view of the prospects of resolving what he regards as basic contradictions in Metz's theory of filmic writing (1992: 151-153).

15. Of course, the manner of self-reflectivity will differ in each instance. Rear Window continually introduces figures of and dialogues about voyeurism to suggest the situation of the film's viewer. Wavelength may be said to materialize some features of camera work, and especially the zoom lens, and their effects on cinematic space, while La Chinoise works closely with framing, frontality and sound-image relations and the effects that arise from the systematic limitation.

16. Because Lana Turner cannot look back, according to Mulvey (1975), it is her definition to appear in a film as a "to-be-looking-at-ness," though Mulvey departs utterly from Metz when she argues that the viewer does not know that these persons have disappeared, before a firing squad or an avalanche.

17. This question is unanswerable here but The Silence of the Lambs is not in fact a film of complex enunciative design. However, even a glance at Halberstam's consideration of the film's maker might well be beside the point when the sole conveyance of the message of a political prisoner or an Andean explorer is the film before us and we already know that these persons have disappeared, before a firing squad or an avalanche.

18. Compared, that is, to Citizen Kane or Last Year at Marienbad, Oliver Stone's JFK, or other films of similar narrative ambition.

19. For example, the Canadian director Denys Arcand has consistently used parallel plotting and crosscutting to severe or sharply qualify a viewer's tendency to associate with any character's perspective.

20. In Psycho, the character Marion Crane is almost perfectly coordinated with the film's enunciation during the first forty minutes, that is, until a murder abruptly terminates her role. While this is a very dramatic example, it is completely commonplace for films to shift away from character narrators at will.

21. Casetti's use of Wyler recalls that Bazin's account of the look in the director famously possesses all the mystery of his aesthetic realism. Hitchcock's mobile camera in Rear Window has no such aesthetic reputation.


23. Indeed, Hitchcock, the enunciator, intrudes exactly at moments when the protagonist's investigation into the murder seems to be deluding, notably for a montage sequence that boldly leaves the restriction of the hero's apartment and assumes perspectives impossible to any character.

24. See Casetti (1986) for his discussion of Antonioni and Hitchcock, which are clear and contained analyses that indicate that he feels no compulsion to apply more than a portion of his model to deal with particular filmmakers.

25. Metz does not consider the possibility of other persons being involved in the cinematic situation, such as the testimony of real people in a documentary, where the vanishing act of the film's maker might well be beside the point when the sole conveyance of the message of a political prisoner or an Andean explorer is the film before us and we already know that these persons have disappeared, before a firing squad or an avalanche.

26. References


Baudry, Jean-Louis (1981) "Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematic Apparatus," in The Apparatus...